Purpose -The paper aims to query the value of strategies implemented, notably in France, and to demonstrate the largely ignored link between demographics and economics. Design/methodology/approach -The paper achieves its objective by comparing statistics of European Union (EU) members and competitors to reveal that traditional views on economics and social policy may no longer apply.
themselves in a position of diminished political influence. The enlargement of Europe continues but the apparent success is paralyzing the Old Continent more than ever because of the need to reform the Constitution as well as the rules about decisions based on majority rather than unanimity. Certain geo-political analysts would not exclude scenarios in which the EU collapses and member states revert to national currencies. The election of a pro-Union president in France has lead to some progress, at least on the question of a simplified treaty. In sum, Europe has stalled and no serious progress can be made while one of its principal member states is in an election period. In other words, the window of opportunity to move ahead has been narrowed, while Europe's political impotence is increasing along with the number of member states.
However, let us not be pessimistic about the future because, to paraphrase Jean Monnet, Europe exists out of necessity. Issues such as security, immigration policy, negotiation on international trade, and global sustainable development are all good reasons to remain optimistic. Every day Europe is making progress in implementing and regulating. Europe is moving ahead, albeit at its own pace, on previous decisions and directives. The new members from the East are experiencing record growth and integrating quickly into the European economic space, even though they have not benefited from the same aid as Greece and Portugal did during prior enlargements.
These points of convergence should not make us forget the growing divergence among European countries, as observed in growth per capita, working hours, social models, or immigration policies. We need to recognise the fact that rosy promises about market growth and a single currency have not come true. Overall, small member states without a large domestic market have continued to experience greater growth than the large countries and those within the Euro zone. The principal exceptions are Spain and Ireland (see Table I ). Otherwise many member states are mired in a soft-growth cycle and a series of budget deficits. The Euro is not to blame, though; it simply served to reveal weaknesses in large countries, like Italy, which can no longer rely on an independent monetary policy prone to frequent devaluations. Similarly, without the Euro (still strong because of Germany's manufacturing surpluses), France would be obliged to devalue its currency and, as in 1983, be more disciplined about managing its expenses and public debt [1] .
The times are indeed changing. Germany has recently completed the reunification process and gotten back to work. In fact, Germany will soon break free of the Franco-German couple, now a train without a locomotive, and ask the French, along with other European member states, to pull up their socks. We know that France is the only large, developed country where the majority of the population considers a liberal market economy negatively. This opinion stems from the fact that globalisation is systematically presented as a threat in France. This French exception appears all the more inconsistent given that the world is experiencing unprecedented growth almost everywhere, and is in a state of relative peace, without the spectre of a major world war which would bleed Europe's population dry. Of course, the European population is aging and the old continent must welcome immigrants in order to meet labour shortages that can already be felt. There is still some complementarity in the Franco-German couple to consider, though. Germany remains exemplary in competitiveness; France, in family policy, which enables it to be placed second in EU fertility rates. France manages this despite the regular downgrading of family policies and constant decline in the quality of life for families with children. Yet this fine performance has been tarnished by the failure of a republican integration model that was supposed to be exemplary and universal. (Martin, 2007) . 1980/1990 1990/2000 2000/2005 1980/1990 1990/2000 2000/2005 1980/1990 1990/2000 2000/2005 1980/1990 1990/2000 Not surprisingly, immigration has become a political hot potato in Europe. Recent events in France and Britain, such as the Parisian banlieue riots and the British sentiment that many immigrants are subversive terrorists reveal the divisive nature of immigration in Europe. Yet immigrants generally become productive citizens, especially if the immigration process is structured to promote integration. Until recently, ''assimilation'' was a dirty word in Britain; however, polls in the UK show that selecting immigrants and requiring them to learn English to ensure ''cohesion'' may have become acceptable (Marrin, 2007) . A revision of immigration policy can be expected in both these EU countries, as the rise of Islamic terrorism and the social stress resulting from ineffective cultural assimilation are far more urgent problems throughout Europe than scientific space missions or a technology race with the USA and East Asia.
Optimism about action should not make us forget to be pragmatic as we consider Europe's problems. Pertinent questions often appear to be impertinent to those involved and some may even be tempted to keep quiet just to keep everyone happy. This is not, however, the case for futurists who must pose the very questions that disturb. In fact, we want to raise a few disturbing topics such as reforming the CAP, liberalising Europe to trade and globalisation; industry's role in economic competitiveness, and the consequences of an aging population on economic growth.
Open Europe does not mean discount Europe
Liberalisation of international trade has led to unprecedented growth around the world. Since 1947, average customs tariffs have fallen by approximately 90 per cent among industrialised countries. Meanwhile, trade has increased 20-fold; world production, tenfold. The next step is to attack non-tariff barriers and protectionist practices of countries such as the USA.
An open Europe must not mean a discounted Europe, though. In fact the EU must use all its influence on the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to organise free trade and oppose the ''law of the strongest''. All of Europe should agree on the principle of reciprocity in terms of open borders. All this should be done, of course, without ever giving in to the temptation of protectionism.
Competition from countries with cheap labour certainly makes the headlines. Overall, however, the EU has balanced trade with the rest of the world. In fact, trade represents approximately one-quarter of European production (the same for France), while two-thirds of its imports and exports are destined for Europe itself. It would be dangerous then to regulate trade and production according to employment figures because countries share an advantage in trade, even if that advantage is unevenly distributed. Thanks to trade, countries grow mutually richer whereas if they close their borders to trade, they grow mutually poorer and cease making progress.
Everyone benefits from the internationalisation of trade. In fact, even if jobs are lost in some sectors, wealth is increased overall. Accusing newly industrialised nations is no longer acceptable because OECD and Economic Analysis Council (CAE) studies have shown that overall foreign trade represents a positive net balance in employment. In terms of ethics, one cannot ask weaker countries to accept anti-competition laws when favourable and reject them when inconvenient. One cannot refuse to import what low-wage countries produce more competitively since low labour costs constitute these countries' principal comparative advantage. Encouraging less developed countries to trade remains the most effective tool for improving their social situation.
Greater specialisation is profitable in industrialised countries because it leverages comparative advantage. A glance at the French and German cases make this point clear.
Industrial imports represent approximately 40 per cent of domestic consumption in both France and Germany. However, the share of such imports coming from low-wage countries (low-value goods which require a lot of unskilled labour) in that category is only 11 per cent in France versus 24 per cent in Germany. In other words, German industry is better in terms of sourcing and exploiting cheaper supplies. This explains how the Germans were able to return to a trade surplus shortly after reunification, and how they remain both more competitive and more specialised than the French.
Globalisation does not necessarily mean diminished standards of living. However, for the less-developed countries to catch up, economic and social changes will be necessary in the more advanced countries, and these changes will prove all the more painful because they will likely come as a surprise.
Revise the CAP without forgetting ''food as weapon''
On the basis of the Berlin agreements and the Luxemburg compromise in 2003, the CAP is scheduled to end in 2013. In the years leading up to 2013, market liberalisation, and decreases in subsidies of all kinds, including export assistance and direct aid to farmers, will take place gradually. It is true that we were subsidising agricultural products. These sorts of subsidies distort agricultural markets, encourage inefficiency, and create wasteful surpluses. A full 80 per cent of agricultural subsidies were allocated to 20 per cent of farmers, most of whom were using intensive methods of cultivation, which ravishes the environment and requires greater inputs of scarce water.
This decoupling of subsidies with production -total or progressive, depending on the country -means that the 80 per cent of farmers who received 20 per cent of the funds will continue to farm only if they can make more money by producing crops rather than by doing nothing. This is actually a programmed revolution in European agricultural policy in which we hope to buy the silence of farmers, ever fewer in number, by continuing to subsidise them without their producing anything or rather with the justified environmental restrictions. This ''Last of the Mohicans'' scenario has not been rejected by farmers because they may actually come out ahead. It is similar to paying for past crops and since there are fewer farmers, each one makes the same, perhaps more, even if farm aid decreases overall. The result of this ineffective policy will likely be a partial decentralisation of the agricultural policy throughout Europe.
The CAP represents over 40 per cent of community expenses for 2 per cent of the active population. CAP opponents never miss a chance to brandish these figures and call for the dismantling of the common policy in the name of other European priorities made necessary by enlargement or simply through modernity, which encourages us to develop through research, training, infrastructure and social policy. Actually, agriculture is the only field in which community policy replaced national policies, and where European and national public aid, which is devoted to agriculture in Europe, does not surpass its proportion in the active population.
The CAP has been a great success in Europe but must be completely revised if only because new Eastern members are now integrating into the Union. Their entry implies the conversion and modernisation of an active labour force similar to that of France in the 1950s. Logical farming, with its emphasis on ''traceability'', and respect for the environment, is only the first step toward sustainable development. We all know that the subsidies granted in rich countries have led to artificial prices worldwide. Indeed these prices are unrelated to real production costs and, in the end, too low to cover production and importation from less-developed countries. For instance, in Europe and the USA, where 70 per cent of the overall cotton production is concentrated, the subsidy per kilo has surpassed the selling price. In these conditions, the more competitive African cotton cannot fetch a fair price hence its production and export cannot develop normally. The same logic applies to cereal, sugar and other staples.
Given the clout of the USA, the world price of agricultural products is often a dumping price designed to move American surpluses. If the CAP is to be revised according to the principals of sustainable development, it will be important to do so without US pressure. Of course, not all EU members are equally invested in agriculture. France represents 20 per cent of the net added value of European agriculture; Italy, 19 per cent; Spain, 18 per cent and the others follow far behind, e.g. Germany, 10 per cent; Greece, 7 per cent and the UK, 6.5 per cent. Europe must not let down its guard, though. Agricultural aid is slightly lower in volume in the USA, but higher per farmer ($20,000 in the USA vs $14,000 in the EU). According to the Farm Bill, American agricultural assistance should increase by 70 per cent in ten years. In other words, now is not the time to dismantle our system while the Americans are reinforcing theirs. Germany weighs in at double France in terms of exports within the Union versus exports to the rest of the world (27 per cent vs 13 per cent). Germany's principal strength lies in the surplus for ''machinery and equipment'' -155 billion Euros versus only 11 billion Euros in France. Chemical products follow at 31 billion euros in Germany versus 10 billion in France. ''Other manufactured goods'' represents 29 billion euros in Germany against a deficit of 19 billion euros in France. This last item underscores the fact that industrial specialisation is the best line of defence against an invasion of imports from emerging countries with low labour costs.
If European manufacturers wish to compete internationally, they must specialise with innovative products and services with a high quotient of added value. There are neither condemned sectors nor commercial fatalities due to companies themselves. There are, however, poor managers and entrepreneurs who no longer question their production methods in an ever-changing world where innovation is necessary. Companies that remain content selling what they produce are indeed condemned because in order to conquer a market, one must produce what actually sells; i.e. goods and services that meet real or latent needs. Innovative entrepreneurs are the true motors of growth. However innovation should always be plural, i.e. technical for processes and products, but also commercial, financial, and social.
No sustainable growth without children
Reports on technology, innovation and competitiveness fill libraries and line drawers. In these documents, workers are often treated merely as human capital. In terms of training, the employer is considered correctly as an investment and a long-term growth factor.
Demographics are generally treated only in terms of aging from the top down (more seniors) with the ensuing problems. However, little is presented on the consequences of aging from the bottom up (fewer young people) and the impact on growth and Europe's place in the world.
Economists ''refuse to see'' the link between economic growth and demographics thus they do not even verify it (Sauvy, 1980) . Comparisons of growth rates in Europe and the USA usually use technology to explain long-term differences. One wonders though if there is not also a demographic multiplier effect (Godet and Durance, 2006 ) (see Box 1.) European countries are like orchards full of trees. After 40 fruitful years, the grove reached maturity without anyone having planted new seeds. If we are to invest and consume, we must be optimistic about the future and prepare for it. These are characteristics that, unfortunately, decline with age. In economics and demographics, the same dynamic applies: a zest for life may be expressed in terms of an economic initiative or a nursery full of children. The family spirit is closely related to the corporate spirit.
European leaders are well aware of aging from the top down. They know that health and retirement plans will require some painful measures. For instance, we need to ensure that funds will be available to support those aged 80 and greater, a demographic that will double by the year 2035! We may push back these dates, but overall the younger generation, still working but fewer in number, will have to pay for the older generation's care.
Regional development factors are endogenous and depend upon the economic dynamics of the local active population. The more people there are, and the more entrepreneurial they behave, the healthier the region. In short, the problems of economic development are internal, and the impact of globalisation on our economies must seriously be put into perspective.
In order to compensate for a demographic deficit, Europe must open up the borders to considerable but selective immigration. Integration will need to be legislated through public and family policies that are more flexible in terms of integration. In fact, integration will go better if there is a mix, especially in the schools. Hence the need to encourage people to have children in the old European countries, like France and Germany, where polls indicate Box 1. Beware the technology mirage of the knowledge society
Europe is infatuated with the concept of the knowledge society or economy, even setting itself the goal of becoming a world leader in this category. An aging Old World is reassured about its future, imagined as full of grey-haired sages with youthful spirits and innovative minds.
Meanwhile the capacity of companies to ''learn how to learn'' has become a key factor in measuring competitiveness. However, many firms have developed contrary practices, as seen in their urgent and reactive behavior that prevails over any projects or foresight efforts. The memory of ideas is being ignored, even destroyed. Getting rid of workers over the age of 55; i.e. holders of the celebrated human capital that is supposedly valued so much, bears eloquent witness to this attitude. If we are moving towards the knowledge economy, we really must respect knowledge rather than mistreat it.
Knowledge is indeed the driving force of innovation, while technology remains important but not always essential. We should stop considering R&D expenses as the principal indicator of hope for the future. The efficiency of expenditure counts more than the amount spent. International comparative studies show that the most successful companies within a sector are those making an average R&D effort. In others words, they are taking action while spending less [2] .
that one in two women would like another child but cannot because of the problems inherent in balancing family and career. Similarly recent British statistics indicate that slightly higher birthrates do not reflect such a rosy picture. Experts see some women over age 35 who delayed having children now giving birth, but many in the middle-income bracket decide not to have children because of the spiralling costs of living (Martin, 2007) .
Overall, aging from the top down is actually good news for Europeans who are living longer and in better health. There is bad news only when there is no next generation to take up the baton. What must be avoided is aging from the bottom of the pyramid. Otherwise what good is ''saving the whales'', if there are no more children around to see them?
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